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The silence that surrounded the death of Carlo Michelstaedter 
in 1910 can be explained in the light of the Italian cultural climate 
of the time, which was dominated by Benedetto Croce. In Croce's 
philosophical system, based on the strict separation between the 
human faculties, there was no space for a personality like 
Michelstaedter' s whose aim was the abolition of this very separa-
tion. He was, in fact, a philosopher, a painter and a poet, con-
stantly changing his mode of expression in an ever frustrating 
attempt to grasp the essence of life and to find the perfect expres-
sive form. 1 
Born in Gorizia in 1887 into a Jewish family of high cultural 
tradition, Carlo Michelstaedter was a spokesman of that complex 
Middle-European culture. Although he spent his most productive 
years in Florence where he attended the university, and although 
he considered himself Italian, he did not take part in the 
philosophical movement of the time-his scorn for Croce was 
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open. 2 Besides the Greek philosophers whom he studied at the 
university, he was strongly influenced by northern thinkers: 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Dostojevski, Ibsen, and by 
Beethoven's music. 
Michelstaedter killed himself in 1910, at 23. The reason for 
his action, as is often the case with suicides, remains purely 
speculative. Yet he left enough material to give some support to 
conjectures on the existential crisis that brought him to his preco-
cious end. 3 
In a letter to his sister Paula, who, like the Paolina of Leopardi, 
was also his confidant, Carlo made a lucid diagnosis of his illness: 
It is in part an individual condition, in part the illness of the age 
[la malattia dell' epoca] insofar as moral balance is concerned, because 
we are presently living in an age in which changes in society seem 
to go hand-in-hand with a dissolution of all bonds . . . and the 
pathways of existence are no longer sharply drawn . . . and it 
depends upon personal initiative to create the luminous path 
through universal chaos. 4 
He was only 19 then, but had already clearly analyzed a disease 
which was historical and for which there was no cure. He was 
totally aware of living in the era of God's death, as Nietzsche had 
stated, and with the death of God, of the end of all absolutes and 
eternal truths; the end, that is, of all the myths created by man . 
Schopenhauer had opened to him the path in this direction and 
Nietzsche must have accompanied him through it. Carlo, how-
ever, is also able to perform self-analysis, to look into himself and 
to discover his own weaknesses, or dark side. In the same letter, 
in fact, he writes: 
I suffer because I feel cowardly, weak, because I see myself as 
incapable of controlling things and people as I am incapable of 
controlling the ideas that race through my head . . . the way I have 
no control over my passions; because I have no moral balance ... 
because I have no intellectual equilibrium, so that thought goes 
straight to its goal ... because ... everything is slipping through 
my hands . .. and more and more I'm convinced that I am but a 
degenerate . (Epistolario 157) 
Carlo's tragedy was that he could not accept his weakness, neither 
could he accept the small lot that destiny had assigned him and 
all other human beings. He strove to imitate the great persuasi of 
history: Socrates and Christ, who freed themselves from con-
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tingency and in whom the coincidence of thought and action, 
theory and practice was realized. 
Carlo writes a whole thesis to try to understand and explain 
his idea of Persuasione and its opposite, Rettorica. The thesis had 
begun as an examination of these two concepts in Plato and Aris-
totle, but it soon left the two Greek philosophers behind. Carlo's 
frustration is apparent from the start. Persuasione, his goal, his life 
model, not only cannot be achieved, but cannot even be defined, 
except negatively and through metaphors. Although it is man's 
main goal, he can achieve it only through death. Its essence, in 
fact, is contradictory to that of physical life. 
His metaphor of the weight well exemplifies it. The essence 
of the weight is to fall; this is its will, destined to be frustrated. 
Were the weight, in fact, to reach its goal, to fulfill its need, that 
is, falling, it would be falling· to its end, stasis, in other words the 
opposite of its essence. 
So it is with man's essence: "I know I want," writes 
Michelstaedter, "and I do not have what I want". 5 Man's essence, 
thus, as Leopardi had already said, consists in his will, in his 
desire; it consists in a lack, in a nonbeing, in an infinite and 
never-ending tension. Man desires the absolute, which does not 
exist, or it exists only as a tension because, like for the weight, if 
it existed it would cease to be an absolute. Its essence, therefore, 
is negative and Michelstaedter states it clearly when he explains: 
I have never known what the absolute is, yet I know it the way 
the insomniac knows sleep, the way the beholder of darkness 
knows light. This I know, that my conscience ... is made up of 
lack [e fatta di deficienza]. (Persuasione 96) 
Yet, continues Carlo, the real "persuaso" is he who needs nothing 
from outside for he has all in himself (44). 
This extreme position is doomed to be frustrated, and Carlo 
knows it well. Man needs others and the world outside; his being 
is determined by that of others. He is so certain of the impossibility 
of achieving Persuasione that he calls the second chapter of his 
work "L'illusione della persuasione." This "illusion" is born when 
man transforms that which exists only for himself, that which is 
good only for himself into objective entities, into the absolute 
good. In Chapter 3, where he tries to show the "route to Persua-
sion," his fatal destiny becomes evident. 
Twenty pages extremely rich in images, metaphors, parables. 
The use of the Gospels, as well as of the Greek texts, is constant. 
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Statements are presented, with the authority of axioms, as abso-
lute truths, unshakable and indubitable. Yet they are totally 
abstract and detached from reality. They culminate in the maxim 
"to give is to do the impossible; to give is to receive" (82). Man 
must affirm himself not in order to continue to exist, "he must 
love the world not because it is necessary to his own needs, but 
for what it is, in itself" (82). In short he must live without relation 
with the other, without "weight," having escaped the law of grav-
ity, that is, having overcome that law which bodies obeyed and 
in which their nature or essence consists. This he must do, not 
as Plato did, trying to reach the absolute by clinging to his body, 
but as Socrates and Christ, renouncing their bodies, in the recog-
nition that man must deny his physical being in order to obtain 
his absolute one. 
Michelstaedter seems to hope for a return to Parmenides, 6 a 
position which, as Campailla intelligently points out, finds today 
a fertile ground in the philosophy of Emanuele Severino, but 
which, nevertheless, has strong opponents in the philosophers 
of "II Pensiero Debole" whose leading exponent is Gianni Vat-
timo.7 Vattimo, faithful follower of Heidegger, states, in line with 
hermeneutics: "Non si da' essere se non come evento, come acca-
dere di orizzonti linguistici, entro cui gli enti ci divengono acces-
sibili; I' essere e solo questo accadere e il suo tramandarsi. "8 Against 
Parmenides: "being is not ... rather, it 'happens'," that is "be-
comes." Being, therefore, exists insofar as it becomes; it exists as 
"becoming. "9 
Michelstaedter's wish, however, is the desperate illusion of 
one aware of the impossibility of its ever becoming true. He too 
believed that one can know "being" only through "becoming," 
as he was aware of the impossibility of achieving Persuasione, or 
consistency with the Parmenidean on for it would exclude "becom-
ing," and therefore the life of nature. Yet he could not abandon 
the belief in an absolute being, never changing, self-contained, 
self-sufficient, and, what was more, he could not renounce the 
desire of making his own self into it. It was this dichotomy that 
tore him in two. He lived it more intensely than other thinkers 
since he himself had such a physical, sensual nature. 
The Epistolario is the best source for this important aspect of 
Michelstaedter' s personality. The hundreds of letters written at 
home and to his intimate friends clearly show the intensity of his 
sensuality and physical being, which he let come out with little 
restraint. It immediately appears evident how much Carlo trea-
sures and cultivates this side of himself: his exhausting mountain 
climbing, his passion for dancing ("a physical pleasure, an un-
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matched voluptuousness" he calls it [Epistolario 98]), his long 
swims in the rough waters of the Isonzo which made him famous 
and proud, and his frustrations when an injury to his leg blocked 
him at home for some time. He was constantly pushing himself 
to the limits of his capabilities, and nature was his beloved play-
ground. There he had the illusion of reaching that absolute that 
as a social being he never could even approach. 
The letter written at home describing the funeral of Carducci 
succeeds perhaps better than others in pointing out this aspect 
of Carlo's nature. It does it with the force created by a contrast. 
The main subject, in fact, is death, yet its end is a hymn to sensual 
life. Carlo loves Bologna for its richness, abundance, fullness of 
life. The qualifiers he chooses to describe it are self-explanatory: 
I think of Bologna again, of the past three days; they appear to be 
an oasis of a superior sun and life, so intense, that I'll be scarred by 
it for the rest of my life. But then, I love Bologna, with its porticos, 
its beautiful dark-red plazzos, its beautiful vast piazzas, its imposing 
San Petronio church, its lively movement . . . of happy people 
everywhere in throngs to see and to be seen enjoying life. I love 
the generous and sincere cordiality of the people, I like the teeming 
public placs, full of life and warmth, and ... more than anything 
else, I love its women, opulent, radiant with life, who smile when 
smiled at, and who seem to give themselves entirely through the 
glance {sguardo]. (186) [My Emphasis] 
We seem almost to be listening to the voice of Zeno Cosini, another 
lover of intense living, women and action, and likewise a victim 
of thought and reflection. 
Carlo too is fully aware of this dichotomy of action and 
thought. He shows it when he writes to Paula: "Above all, I think 
of my body, it is important to me," and a few paragraphs later: 
"I must stop talking about myself, because I must stop looking 
into myself-it can be intellectually useful, but it's not healthy" 
(305, 306). Again it is Zeno who comes to mind with his theory 
that thought and self-analysis paralyze action and make it impos-
sible.10 The "intellectually useful" thus coincides with the physi-
cally damaging. Zeno, however, makes his choice and accepts its 
consequences: he will be a paralytic thinker, and when he will 
decide to follow his impulse and pursue a woman, he will just 
do it without trying to rationalize it. And he even laughs at himself. 
Carlo cannot choose, neither can he laugh nor accept the necessity 
of compromise. In his Nietzschean dream of asserting himself as 
the iiber-Mensch, he prefers death to compromise. 
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To his great friend Gaetano Chiavacci, Carlo writes a beautiful 
letter where he explains his torment. It's a letter written from 
Gorizia describing the days spent vacationing at Pirano with Paula 
and the Cassini sisters. Days of physical activities: walking, climb-
ing, swimming, sailing, dancing; where even talking is purposely 
reduced to a minimum in order to live more intensely the life of 
nature (Epistolario 331). Carlo's enjoyment and fulfillment are evi-
dent. The descriptions are detailed together with those of the 
nature which was the perfect background of the activities and 
with which Carlo seems to reach a perfect union. 
The appealing offer made to him by some fishermen to remain 
with them and live on the sea, though not taken seriously, makes 
Carlo feel that he is part of that nature. But Carlo is also a creature 
of thought. The beautiful comparison of his brain to the sea con-
veys all the power and intensity of Carlo's chaotic needs and 
feelings: 
My mind is like an undulating sea that reflects all lights, that mirrors 
... all the skies ... but that shatters them all at the focal point-but 
the bottom remains murky and dark ... certainly I have what the 
sea has not: I have the uninterrupted torment of bygone intentions 
and of future commitments, of the different and unfulfilled yearn-
ings: the consciousness of my meaninglessness [nullita] in this 
world regulated by actions as well as by thought and art; of life 
dissolving awaiting what? In the illusion of a progresive shaping 
[formarsi] that does not exist. (330) 
The image could not have been more effective. The sea, symbol 
of the force, vitality, infinity and freedom of nature, is here made 
to coincide ( or at least Carlo is trying to make it do so) with the 
intellectual, spiritual absolute. But this attempt is bound to fail; 
the two can never coincide. 
Carlo's brain is like the sea with its strength, force, freedom, 
but also with its dark, irrational, turbid side. The brain-sea image 
proves his nonacceptance to be only like the sea or the fisherman, 
and his need and continuous attempt to be everything: nature 
and spirit, action and ideal to a degree of perfection. And frustra-
tion follows frustration. "I realize with growing terror that I am 
condemned to staying outside of the intensity, passion, greatness 
of life, and that I will never have a way of living it within me" 
(331). And in his depression he admits: "There would be nothing 
left for me to do than a physical violent life, go wandering on 
horseback through the plains and rest at night in a tent counting 
the stars." Leopardi's presence is powerful, as is this ultimate 
negative response to this rhetorical proposition. As for the Leopar-
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dian shepherd, the life of nature is not enough for Carlo, yet 
intellectual fulfillment escapes him: 
There is no possibility for me to embrace a larger whole .... So I 
am unable to think or write or paint; I loathe myself ... I am so 
unhappy-and I see no chance of anything changing except to get 
worse. (336-37) 
Carlo's complete awareness of this tension within himself is 
even more evident when his good friend Rico leaves on a ship 
for the American adventure. He feels admiration and envy. So 
well can he analyze his contradictory feelings that, writing to Nino 
about their common friend, he comments: "la lettera di Rico ... 
mi mise il fuoco addosso per quanto penso a noi, che, invidian-
dolo, siamo impediti nel volerlo raggiungere dalle stesse cose che 
c'impedirono di partir con lui" (436). But Carlo belongs only in 
part to "the race of those who remain on earth." 11 And this was 
to be his tragedy. 
The one hundred polemical pages Carlo devotes to "la Ret-
torica" are dictated by his strong need for authenticity and his 
hatred of hypocrisy and empty words. He can finally be effective, 
as he could never be in talking about "Persuasione," for he has 
a solid ground on which to move and real foes to attack. His tone 
is highly sarcastic, even vitriolic. Here he pours out his own fus-
trations as a man. "Persuasione" cannot be achieved and it is 
useless even to speak about it, since, as he teaches, "Persuasione" 
cannot be put into words-it will necessarily transform itself into 
"Rettorica" -but it must be lived. Now he can finally say with 
plenty of examples what "Rettorica" is. He appears as a great 
rhetorician-hence his poison and fury. In his very fight against 
"Rettorica," he is caught in it. 
The life of "Persuasione" is thus unattainable; man becomes 
lost in his search for it. He needs help and clings to something 
or someone; he asks to be for someone. "Owing to his illusion, 
he calls what 'is' what 'is for him'; he calls it good or bad according 
to whether he Iikes it or dislikes it" (Persuasione 97). He creates 
"Rettorica" malgre lui. It seems hard to believe how Michelstaedter, 
caught in this impasse, refused to overcome it by accepting it, as 
the only possible way for man to be. Although he affirmed that 
"l'uomo deve accontentarsi del segno convenzionale che nasconde 
l'oscurita" (101), he himself could never accept darkness, and 
continued to fight for the inexistent light. He knew, however, 
that the only light obtainable in this world is the one of he who 
"turns himself into flame." 12 
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The step Carlo could not or did not want to take was instead 
taken by Heidegger as he asserted the linguistic essence of being, 
and his followers are today continuing in this line . Truth "has no 
metaphysical or logical nature, only a rhetorical one," says G. 
Vattimo. "Truth is the result of interpretation ... because it is 
only in the interpretative process that truth constitutes itself. "13 
This is hermeneutics, today's philosophy, which "in inheriting 
and bringing to its ultimate consequences a diffuse tendency in 
twentieth-century thought, it concentrates on the relationship be-
tween language and being, and on the interpretive characteristic 
of all of existence ."14 Vattimo calls his new philosophy "the weak 
ontology" or the "pluralistic ontology" in which plurality is not a 
moment to be rescued and overcome in a higher synthesis, in a 
final unity, but it is a permanent condition. 15 He well sees the 
relation of such a position with the rediscovery of the tragic ele-
ment of the human condition, characteristic of some neoexisten-
tialist modern philosophy like that of Pareyson and Cacciari. But 
after all, as D. Antiseri says, this "weak thought" has its strength, 
which lies in "its capability of understanding its limit. "16 
The discourse developed by Heidegger and his followers is 
a theoretical discourse. Being exists only in its becoming and its 
relation to us interpreters . The Parmenidean on does not exist, or 
to be more precise, it does not concern us because even if it existed 
we could not know it. This discovery guides men in their theoret-
ical as well as practical life: a life which must be accepted with its 
limits and lived within them . 
Michelstaedter, who followed this theoretical discourse up to 
the end, could not renounce the Parmenidean on, well aware that, 
having followed his reasoning coherently, the possession of the 
absolute on would be impossible-a contradiction in terms. He 
well knew that Persuasione is an aporia. His attempt, therefore, 
was to move it from the dangerous grounds of theoretics to those 
of practice . 17 Persuasione cannot be known and expressed through 
concepts-it would transform itself into Rettorica; it must be lived. 
It is not the knowledge of the absolute that must be sought, but 
the life of the absolute. 
He therefore continues his search. Socrates and Christ had 
taught man to renounce the finite, material side of his nature, to 
affirm himself as a self-contained and self-sufficient being, with 
no needs for and dependence on the external world. Since life is 
needs, the negation of all needs is death . The finite individual 
who wants himself infinite knows that he can only be it through 
the destruction of his finite, empirical being. 
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Although nobody can ascertain the reasons behind 
Michelstaedter's suicide, it must be said, to pay justice to a victim 
of honest thought, that his rigorous logic had brought him to the 
conclusion that 
Only when you do not want will you have what you want, because 
what you want is absolute being, and your will is all but con-
tingency: it is not in itself ... as long as it will be, your body will 
cast a shadow so that you cannot see; when you will no longer be, 
you will have the possibility of seeing. (Opere 781)18 
So he chose to be no more. 
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